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T HIS PAPER reviews the discovery methods lawyers use in
litigation arising out of a mid-air crash. While the focus is
on the defense lawyer's point of view, the reader should re-
member that mid-air crashes rarely result from the conduct of
only one pilot or one tortfeasor. Hence, the attorney's best de-
fense strategy is to pursue every theory of liability that plain-
tiff's counsel would likewise pursue.
Defense attorneys generally enjoy the advantage of involve-
ment in the post-accident investigation much earlier than
plaintiff's counsel, especially in general aviation crashes. In-
surance carriers recognize the high liability exposure and the
inevitable litigation that mid-air collisions produce, and act
quickly to involve counsel at the earliest possible time. All ad-
justers' reports are channeled through counsel to take advan-
tage of the attorney-work product privilege that attaches in
most jurisdictions. This process protects from later discovery
most of what the adjuster learns during the course of his im-
mediate post-accident investigation.
The defense attorney's discovery plan is formulated through
consideration of what caused the two aircraft to collide. The
lawyer must be aware, therefore, of the numerous informa-
tional sources and investigative tools available to aid in the
determination of accident causation. After all is said and
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done, mid-air collisions are caused either by the failure of one
or both pilots to "see and avoid" the other or by carelessness
on the part of air traffic controllers employed by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA).
II. MID-AIR COLLISIONS-THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES
Statistical studies compiled by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) indicate that general aviation aircraft
are involved in nearly ninety-seven percent of the mid-air col-
lisions in United States civil aviation.1 Surprisingly, approxi-
mately ninety-four percent of all mid-air collisions occur dur-
ing daylight hours in visual flight rules (VFR) weather, and in
more than seventy percent of the cases, no air traffic control
was provided. In cases in which air traffic control was in-
volved, the NTSB lists the air traffic control as a probable
cause in less than four percent of the collisions. The probable
cause listed for more than ninety-two percent of the collisions
is the pilot's failure to "see and avoid" the other aircraft.
When this statistic is combined with the number of accidents
caused by pilot misjudgment, failure to follow approved pro-
cedures and instructions within a terminal control area
(TCA), the figure approaches one hundred percent. Based on
NTSB statistics, the inescapable conclusion is that the fault
generally lies with one or both of the pilots. The pivotal liabil-
ity question and primary focus of discovery, then, is why both
pilots were unaware of the proximity of the other aircraft, and
what function, if any, was performed by an air traffic
controller.2
See Briefs of Accidents Involving Mid-Air Collisions, NTSB REPORT No. NTSB-
AMM-80-2 at 1 (Aug. 5, 1980) (summary chart titled "Midair Collision Accidents:
U.S. Civil Aviation 1958-78"). This document is available to the public through the
National Technichl Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. Briefs of Mid-
Air Collision Accidents for the years 1978, 1979 and 1980 are also available from the
NTSB Accident Data Branch, Washington, D.C. See also Lawton, Answers for Pilots,
AOPA PILOT 32-33 (April 1980).
2 The causes of mid-air collisions are well known and several excellent articles have
been published on the subject. See AOPA Air Safety Foundation, How to Avoid a
Midair Collision, AOPA PILOT 49 (Jan. 1973). See also Lankford, Collision Avoid-
ance, AOPA PILOT 71 (Nov. 1979).
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A. Pilot-In-Command
Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) estab-
lishes that the pilot-in-command, not the air traffic controller,
has the primary responsibility for preventing a mid-air colli-
sion.8 This responsibility is known as the "See-and-Avoid"
rule, which reads as follows:
When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an op-
eration is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual
flight rules, vigilence shall be maintained by each person oper-
ating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft .... 4
In addition, the FARs require further measures to prevent
mid-air collisions. When air traffic is light, the pilot may not
operate his aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a
collision hazard.' In VFR conditions, when operating at alti-
tudes exceeding 3,000 feet above ground level (AGL), aircraft
on a magnetic heading of 0-179 ° are required to operate at an
altitude of odd thousands plus 500 feet and those on a mag-
netic heading of 180-359 ° are required to operate at an alti-
tude of even thousands plus 500 feet.6 Converging aircraft are
required to pass on the right,7 and any aircraft overtaking an-
other must yield the right-of-way to the aircraft being over-
taken.8 If two aircraft are in the landing pattern, the aircraft
with the lower altitude has the right-of-way.'
These "rules of the road" for aircraft operation establish
the statutory standard of care that is required of a pilot. Vio-
lation of these FARs by either party usually entitles counsel
' See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.3, 91.67(a) (1981). See also Coatney v. Berkshire, 500 F.2d
290 (8th Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. United States, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974); Penny v.
United States, 12 Av. Cas. 17,919 (S.D. Ohio 1973); AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 11
224, 260c, 271b, 274d, 400b, and 407a(1) (July 1981). The Airman's Information
Manual is available on a subscription basis from the Department of Transportation,
Publication Section, M-433.1, Washington, D.C. 20590. A guide to all FAA publica-
tions, Order No. FAA-APA-PG-3, is available free of charge from the same address.
4 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(a) (1981).
6 14 C.F.R. §9 91.65(a), 91.9 (1981).
14 C.F.R. 9 91.109 (1981). See also AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 84 (July
1981).
7 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(c), (d) (1981).
8 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(e) (1981).
14 C.F.R. § 91.67(f) (1981).
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to a "negligence per se" instruction. The attorneys for both
sides expend considerable time and effort in formal discovery,
in an effort to prove a causal connection between the violation
of an FAR and the crash.
While the FARs appear to eliminate the risk of mid-air col-
lisions, the rules are far from foolproof. Accidents continue to
occur.'0 To understand why pilots do not "see and avoid"
each other, counsel must explore whether one or both of the
involved pilots took steps to compensate for vision
limitations. "
At a distance, an aircraft on a collision course will often ap-
pear to be motionless. Although motion can be detected by
the eyes without focusing, in order to detect an object without
apparent motion the eyes must focus at the appropriate dis-
tance. For normal vision, however, the scope of focus is quite
narrow, ordinarily in the range of ten to fifteen degrees. 2 The
problem is compounded by cockpit obstructions, dirty and
glare-stricken windshields, haze, and cluttered backgrounds
such as those found near most airport traffic areas.
As preventive measures, in addition to complying with the
FARs, the prudent pilot will adhere to all standard operating
procedures that are set forth at length in Part One of the Air-
men's Information Manual.'s These procedures include: clear-
ing turns, particularly when operating in high density traffic
areas or landing patterns;" monitoring the appropriate con-
trol frequencies; 15 continuously scanning the windshield in a
pattern of eight to ten vision stops while en route;' 6 keeping
all windows clean; wearing appropriate sunglasses; and not
10 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(f) (1981), which gives the right-of-way in the landing
pattern to the lower aircraft and can lead to anomalous results when a lower aircraft
is behind a higher aircraft. But, 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(f) also says that an aircraft shall
not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another aircraft. Id.
" See supra note 2.
" See AOPA Air Safety Foundation, How To Avoid A Midair Collision, AOPA
PILOT 49 (Jan. 1973).
11 This document is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
" See AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 1 275 (July 1981).
" Id. 571.
'o See Id. I 605c.
DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY PLAN
placing charts on the glare-shield where the image will be re-
flected in the windshield.'7 Standard operating procedures
also include avoiding fatigue, which increases focus time and
decreases perception," and equipping the aircraft with a
strobe light and a transponder, preferably with altitude re-
porting capabilities.' 9
B. Air Traffic Control
It is now well settled that operational activities of air traffic
controllers do not come within the discretionary function of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. As stated with an economy of
words, "[d]iscretion was exercised when it was decided to op-
erate the tower, but the tower personnel had no discretion to
operate it negligently."2 0 Moreover, the government no longer
appears to raise the jurisdictional defense exception of discre-
tionary function in air traffic control cases."' As previously
noted, however, the primary responsibility for fair weather
collision avoidance lies with the pilot, even if the aircraft is
under air traffic control.2 2
While at first blush this may seem to be a somewhat incon-
gruous precept, because both pilots may be properly following
instructions from an air traffic controller, the rule has been
defended as follows:
The reasoning behind this elementary principle of VFR flight
is obvious. The pilot is in a far better position to look out for
potential conflicting traffic than is the tower controller; for the
aircraft, as the facts of this case demonstrate, may be miles
distant from the tower. Moreover, the pilot is in physical con-
trol of the aircraft, and is the only person who can safely and
effectively maneuver that aircraft in order to avoid any traffic
which he may encounter; while the tower controller is generally
See Id. 605b (3).
" See Id. 600f.
" See supra note 12.
20 Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 931 (1967). See also 2 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 15.8, at
329 (1979).
" See 2 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 15.8 (1979).
" See supra note 3.
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neither trained, qualified nor in a position from which to order
a pilot to perform specific flight maneuvers. Finally, the pilot is
operating his aircraft only, while the tower controller, by con-
trast, is attempting to observe, keep track of, and issue instruc-
tions and clearances to all of the aircraft operating within the
airport traffic area.23
Thus, an instrument flight rules (IFRs) flight plan does not
automatically transfer the responsibility for collision avoid-
ance from the pilot to the controller. The controller's duties
are promulgated by the FAA in the Terminal Air Traffic Con-
trol Manual Section 7110.65C and Supplemental Directives, 4
which have been held to establish, as a matter of law, the sep-
aration criteria to be applied by the controller in the control
of air traffic." Consistent with the directives contained in the
Terminal Air Traffic Control Manual, air traffic control is re-
sponsible only for establishing separation between aircraft
that are operating either:
1) on IFR flight plans and not under VFR conditions; or
2) within terminal control areas, if the controller sees both air-
craft and has not instructed the pilots to maintain separation.
Cases against air traffic controllers have been successful
when the controllers failed to use all equipment available to
prevent a collision, failed to perceive other aircraft in the pat-
tern, failed to coordinate activities among themselves, failed
to obtain all the necessary data from the pilot before issuing
instructions, or failed to warn the pilots of the proximity of
nearby aircraft or other impending danger." A variety of
problems other than oversight can plague the controllers.
Shift changes may not be properly performed, supervision of
inexperienced controllers may be insufficient, the workload
" Penny v. United States, 12 Av. Cas. 17, 919, 17,920 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
" See Voce v. United States, 13 Av. Cas. 17,189 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also AIR-
MAlN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 1 400 (July 1981).
I& The failure of the FAA to follow its own regulation has been held to be negli-
gence at an operational level. See Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.
Mich. 1975). See generally 2 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW §§ 15.8-
15.9 (1979).
s See L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 5.08 (1981); 2 S. SPEISER & C.
KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 15.24 (1979).
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may be excessive or the equipment may malfunction.
C. The Focus of Discovery
Although it is common practice in aviation cases to name a
seeming myriad of defendants, in the final analysis, a mid-air
collision will generate three potential defendants. These de-
fendants are the pilot of the first aircraft, the pilot of the sec-
ond aircraft, and the air traffic controller. The government
will defend any claims brought against a controller, but with
few exceptions, private defense counsel will represent the in-
terests of one of the two pilots.
As previously noted, statistics show that three out of four
mid-air collisions occur during daylight hours, under VFR
conditions, and with no air traffic control services provided. 7
In the absence of air traffic control, the defense lawyer's ob-
jective is to establish that the defendant pilot was operating
the aircraft in conformity with all the applicable flight rules.
The attorney should also seek to show that the client pilot
took every reasonable precaution to prevent a collision, while
the pilot of the other aircraft did not.
The key to reconstructing a mid-air collision lies in the de-
termination of the altitude and ground track of each aircraft
at the time of the impact. The information sources around
which a discovery plan is built include: (1) percipient wit-
nesses who survive the crash or ground witnesses; (2) air traf-
fic control data, if any; and (3) wreckage distribution as
charted by the investigating authorities and expert analysts. If
the collision involves an air carrier, evidence of the foregoing
information will be recorded on the cockpit voice recorder
(CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR). In addition, a review
of the aircraft logs and flight records for both aircraft may
reveal impediments to vision or prior equipment malfunc-
tions, or may lead to previous pilots of the aircraft who have
such knowledge.
In the event an air traffic controller is involved, the objec-
tive with regard to the other pilot remains unchanged, but the
11 See supra note 1.
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objective in connection with the controller becomes very com-
plicated. The defense lawyer representing the pilot will need
to secure enough admissible evidence to establish a breach of
duty on behalf of a federal employee that proximately caused
the collision. The Federal Aviation Administration is the in-
formation source for determining this issue. Since air traffic
control procedures are quite complex and questions of em-
ployee training or competence may well be involved, an air
traffic control expert must be retained at the earliest opportu-
nity to assist in the preparation of the case.
The key to establishing actionable negligence on behalf of
air traffic control personnel lies in showing the following three
elements: (1) the aircraft were properly within a terminal con-
trol area or on an IFR flight plan; (2) the flight conditions
were such that the pilots were reasonably unable to see and
avoid each other; and (3) by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence the air traffic control personnel could have recognized
the impending danger and alerted the pilots in sufficient time
to prevent the collision. The first element is easy to show,
based on the air traffic controller's records. The second ele-
ment, although somewhat more difficult to prove, can be es-
tablished by the testimony of percipient witnesses, witnesses
in the area, official weather records and the accident recon-
structionist. The third element, of course, is the difficult one.
To prove the third element, the pilot's attorney must present
the appropriate air traffic control documents, expert testi-
mony interpreting those documents, and expert testimony
concerning standard air traffic control procedures.
D. The Strategy Of Discovery
Discovery for defense counsel begins at the moment that
notice of the loss is received. Critical evidence can be lost for-
ever if the lawyer does not take steps for its preservation. De-
fense counsel must immediately make arrangements for pres-
ervation of the aircraft wreckage; take steps to preserve the
present air traffic control records and tapes; and retain and
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consult the appropriate experts."
III. WRECKAGE PRESERVATION
Investigations performed by the NTSB or other investigat-
ing authority are not always totally reliable, and a formal
NTSB report is inadmissible for purposes of civil litigation29
The objective of the NTSB is to promote safety in transporta-
tion and the NTSB has no interest in civil litigation or in pre-
serving evidence for reasons related to litigation.30 Thus, civil
litigants need to perform, to the maximum extent possible, an
independent investigation of the accident circumstances in or-
der to preserve the evidence in admissible form.
The NTSB investigator-in-charge is authorized to designate
additional parties to participate in the field investigation, but
the code requires that any such persons have some particular
expertise that will assist the investigation and specifically ex-
cludes any person who represents a claimant or an insurer.3 1
Defense counsel, however, usually has a head start on the ac-
cident investigation because the insurance carrier's adjusters
will be on the scene shortly after the accident. Insurance ad-
justers ideally will arrive before the conclusion of the NTSB
investigation, and in time to protect the carrier's interests.2
28 In addition to providing critical technical guidance, technical experts are often in
short supply. An expert, once retained, will be unable to consult on behalf of other
parties in the case.
29 See 49 C.F.R. § 835 (1980). At the very least, the aviation attorney must dupli-
cate the gathering and compilation of the information from the various sources drawn
upon by the NTSB itself.
30 See 49 C.F.R. § 800.3 (1980), where it is stated that the primary function of the
NTSB is to promote safety in transportation.
" See 49 C.F.R. § 831 (1980). Occasionally, when an accident involves structural
failure of an aircraft or a major component, representatives of the FAA attend and
work with the NTSB investigator. The NTSB investigator can also request additional
NTSB or FAA specialists and organize the investigation into appropriate investiga-
tive groups, each generally supervised by another NTSB or FAA official. This ap-
proach is normally reserved for collisions involving air carriers, significant public im-
pact, or other complex technical issues. See McWorter, Airplane Accident
Investigation, 28 TENN. L. REV. 122 (1960).
" Under 49 C.F.R. § 830.10 (1980), the operator is responsible for preserving to the
extent possible, any aircraft wreckage and records pertaining to the operation or
maintenance of the aircraft. The wreckage is not to be disturbed in the absence of
exigent circumstances, prior to the NTSB taking custody. If it is necessary to move
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While insurance adjusters and defense experts may be pre-
cluded by regulation from participating in the investigation,
they are not precluded from furthering the defense objectives
at the accident site. In dealing with a mid-air collision, adjust-
ers should locate, in addition to the customary photographs
and factual reports, the air and ground witnesses who have
not presented themselves to the NTSB. The adjusters should
also undertake a thorough search for pieces of the aircraft
wreckage not in the custody of the NTSB, and prepare an ac-
curate plot of the relative locations and positions of any such
parts.
The accident reconstruction expert should document the
wreckage distribution, paint transfer and paint scratch evi-
dence, air impact and ground impact damage, and readings
from aircraft instruments. The expert should also examine
any other indications of the aircraft's altitude, heading, loca-
tion or attitude. From these sources, aviation lawyers can at-
tempt to determine the altitude and flight path of the respec-
tive aircraft, and whether the planes were functioning within
the prescriptions of the applicable FARs.
If the wreckage has not yet been released by the NTSB, the
NTSB should be put on immediate notice that all material in
its possession, including parts, records, documents and air
traffic control tapes are to be preserved, and the wreckage is
to be returned to the custody of defense counsel as agent for
the aircraft owner. When the NTSB has determined that it
has no further need of the wreckage, the wreckage will be re-
leased to the aircraft owner or insurance adjusters at the acci-
dent site."
IV. ATC RECORDS AND TAPES
Air traffic control data is available from four separate facili-
ties: airport control towers (towers);84 terminal radar control
the wreckage, the person so doing shall maintain photographs, sketches and notes of
the original, at-rest position.
:3 49 C.F.R. § 831.10(b) (1980).
4 Airport control towers are located on controlled airports for the purpose of regu-
lating runway traffic.
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facilities (TRACON);35 air route traffic control centers (cen-
ters);"' and flight service stations (FSS). All facilities have va-
rious controllers assigned to each operating position. Commu-
nications from each operating position customarily are
recorded on multi-channel tapes,3 7 each channel recording a
different function, with one channel reserved for a coded time
signal. The duration of a typical tape is sixteen hours, after
which the tape is removed and preserved for fifteen days
before being recycled.38
All air traffic control facilities, with the exception of certain
control towers, are equipped with computerized radar, 9 which
may have data retention capabilities. All facilities maintain
personnel logs showing when each controller's shift started
and ended, and position logs kept on 3x5 cards at each posi-
tion, which are initialled and time dated at shift changes by
both the incoming and outgoing controllers. While basic air
traffic control procedures are set forth in FAA Order No.
7110.65, Air Traffic Control,"' circumstances unique to each
airport and environment necessitate supplemental facility or-
ders and personnel directives.41 These sources are generally in
the form of memos from the chief controller, the regional of-
fice, and Washington, D.C., and are maintained in the "Read-
ing Binder", which the controller must review and initial
when coming on duty.
In the event an accident occurs, an Air Traffic Package is
" Terminal radar control facilities (TRACON) are located on controlled airports,
but in separate facilities from the control towers. TRACON controls approaches and
departures from the airport.
"' Air route traffic control centers are generally at locations other than at con-
trolled airports. Centers provide en route separation and instrument approaches to
uncontrolled airports.
" Most towers have one recorder to cover all positions, generally ranging from 9 to
20 channels, depending upon the complexity of the air traffic control operations.
38 This standard operating procedure is set forth in FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., Fa-
cility Operation and Administration 343, in. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL HANDBOOK OR-
DER No. 7210.3f (1979).
3' Towers and TRACONS are designated as "Arts", and centers are designated as
"NAS Stage A."
40 Among controllers, FAA ORDER No. 7110.65 (1981) is customarily known as
"The Bible."
1' These orders and directives involve coordination between adjacent airports,
boundaries of adjacent airspace, etc.
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prepared, either formally or informally.42 A formal Accident
Package is prepared when a serious case arises involving an
air carrier or when an air traffic controller is obviously in-
volved with the accident. The package will contain the follow-
ing information: 4
1. Certified indexes;
2. Report of Aircraft Accident, FAA Forms 8020-6 and 8020-
6-1;
3. Daily Record of Facility Operation, FAA Form 7230-4;
4. Position Log, FAA Form 7230-10;
5. Flight Progress Strips, FAA Forms 7233-5 and 7230-8;
6. Aircraft Accident/Incident Preliminary Notice, FAA Form
8020-9;
7. Personnel Statements;
8. Flight Plan, FAA Form 7233-1;
9. Flight Chart;
10. Transcription;
11. Facility Accident Notification Record, FAA Form 8020-3;
12. Weather reports and forecasts;
13. Pre-Flight Briefing Log, FAA Form 7233-2.
After reviewing the requirements for data retention, it ap-
pears that the FAA has taken the appropriate steps to pre-
serve pertinent evidence. The aircraft accident package and
certified re-recordings of the retained tapes are available upon
request." Relying on the FAA system for this critical evi-
dence, however, can be dangerous from an evidentiary point
of view.
In the preparation of the Aircraft Accident Package, FAA
personnel are required to retain the pertinent documentation.
The FAA, however, should not be left to make the determina-
tion of what material is "pertinent" to the accident. Moreover,
the FAA, left unchecked, cuts and recycles the original tape at
" See Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting,
FAA ORDER No. 8020.11 V 164a, b (July 1976).
" For a sample Formal Accident Package, see Aircraft Accident and Incident No-
tification, Investigation, and Reporting, FAA ORDER No. 8020.11 app. 3 (July 1976).
1, A letter of request should be addressed to the Regional Director of the FAA
Region. The cost of the certified reproduction, at present, is $25.00 for each channel
requested.
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a point five minutes before its determination of when the first
contact with the aircraft accident took place, and at a point
five minutes following its determination of when the accident
occurred. Relevant conversations between controllers or other
aircraft may have taken place long before or long after the five
minute overlap. Nevertheless, unless steps are taken by the
parties, the tape will be recycled by the FAA. Furthermore, a
litigant must also trust FAA employees to handle the retained
portion of the original tapes properly, to provide suitable re-
production equipment and to operate that equipment
properly.
The air traffic control tapes and other data can be pre-
served, however, in their entire original form, if a letter of re-
quest under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reaches
the Regional Director of the FAA region within fifteen days of
the accident, or before the Aircraft Accident Package is pre-
pared.45 The aviation lawyer or adjuster must move quickly,
though, because the tapes or the remainder thereof can be re-
cycled and returned to service as early as fifteen days follow-
ing the accident. If the pertinent tapes are preserved, the air
traffic control expert should go to the control facilities with
the appropriate equipment to make recordings of the voice
communications directly from the original tapes. In this way
the expert will have the opportunity to review the tapes in
their entirety and assure acquisition of a good copy as well.
Thus, a letter of request under the FOIA to the Regional Di-
rector of the FAA should request preservation of the follow-
ing: (1) the voice and radar computer tapes from all involved
air traffic control facilities for two hours prior and two hours
after the subject accident; (2) the personnel logs, position logs,
Reading Binder, and Position Binder for the week preceding
the accident; (3) the index of facility orders; (4) the complete
Aircraft Accident Package; and, (5) a request for permission
15 See FAA ORDER No. 8020.11 164d(6) (July 1976), which instructs the facility
not to cut the original tapes if notification of litigation has been received. Counsel
should request that the tapes for a specified period of time before and after the acci-
dent be preserved as the accident tape may have been installed immediately before or
withdrawn immediately after the accident.
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allowing an expert to visit the air traffic control facilities to
inspect the requested material and to copy those portions of
the tapes and documents believed to be relevant.
V. WORKING WITH THE EXPERTS
After the air traffic control data has been collected and re-
corded, a complete typewritten transcript of the communica-
tions tapes should be prepared by the air traffic control ex-
pert. It should be noted that, for purposes of preparing the
FAA typewritten transcript, the usual FAA interpretation of
communications "pertinent" to the collision are those commu-
nications to and from the accident aircraft only, and generally
exclude all other conversations. The transcript should be re-
viewed for substance by the accident reconstructionist and pi-
lot expert,"' and the audio tapes should be carefully analyzed
for psychological indicators of confusion, disorientation, or
mistaken assumptions by either of the pilots or on behalf of
air traffic control. 7
The air traffic control documents should be reviewed by the
air traffic control expert for any operational discrepancies, in-
cluding: problems involving controller shift changes; facility
orders or directives which were unread or never complied
with; air traffic controllers on duty, including positions and
times; and indications of who, if anyone, was in a position to
prevent the collision.
The accident wreckage and distribution pattern will provide
the preliminary impact information for the accident recon-
struction expert who, through analysis of paint transfers,
paint scratches, and impact damage, will seek to establish the
relative flight positions, aircraft attitudes and collision angle.
The attorney should also take care to insure that instrument
readings from each involved aircraft are noted early. Instru-
46 With computerized equipment, read-outs are possible in various forms. One such
read-out is the D-Log, in which the inquiry into the computer memory is restricted
by aircraft transponder code, time and geographical area. Thus, from the computer
memory, the timed flight path of a given aircraft in a given location can be provided
directly.
17 The statements, generally, are well sanitized before production under an FOIA
request.
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ment settings often can give some indication of the positions
of the aircraft at the moment of collision.
There can be an infinite variety of contributing factors in-
volved in a mid-air collision. In all but a few cases, it is not
economically feasible or necessary to retain an expert to cover
every conceivable issue. If weather is a factor, a competent
meteorologist should be hired to reconstruct the actual
weather conditions prevailing at the time of the crash. If
weather is not a factor, then certified copies of weather
records at the closest National Weather Service Station will
suffice.
In almost every case, it will be necessary to hire an expert
pilot. While there are many sources for well qualified pilot ex-
perts, it is difficult to improve upon a chief pilot or senior cap-
tain for a major air carrier. In nearly all mid-air collisions, the
testimony of an expert pilot will be given in conjunction with
that of a visibility expert who is specially qualified on matters
relating to reaction times, visual fields, and night vision.
When pilot incapacitation or impairment is a potential issue,
it is advisable to retain a forensic pathologist or some other
medical specialist to review the coroner's autopsy protocol, as
well as to develop a medical profile on one or both of the
pilots.
There is one thing that the lawyer should do in every case.
A model maker should be hired to build either a scale model
of each aircraft, or to attempt to secure from the manufac-
turer a genuine scale model. These models can be invaluable
both at trial and during formal discovery. When depositions
of percipient witnesses or expert accident reconstructionists
are taken, video tape and the aircraft models are useful to
supplement with vivid accuracy, testimony involving the rela-
tive positions of each aircraft, as well as evidence of the loca-
tion of physical damage and paint transfers found on each
aircraft.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The mid-air collision presents defense counsel with a
unique opportunity to act early in a case and to develop all
1982]
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facts necessary to establish the probable cause of the crash.
This process normally occurs before the involvement of a
plaintiff's lawyer and almost always before litigation ensues.
Statistics show that nearly all mid-air collisions result from a
failure of both pilots to see and avoid each other. Given that
fact, the obvious strategy for any defense lawyer is to work on
proving that the other pilot was responsible.
